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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
     This is a diversity suit arising out of a dispute among the 
members of a small limited partnership, HB Partners, L.P.  
Plaintiffs HB General Corp. and HB Limited Corp., brought suit in 
the district court against the third partner, Manchester 
Partners, L.P., seeking a declaratory judgment that Manchester 
had breached the Partnership Agreement.  Although there is 
complete diversity among the three partners, Manchester argues 
that the Partnership itself -- which shares the citizenship of 
all of the parties -- is an indispensable party whose joinder 
destroys diversity jurisdiction.  The district court agreed with 
Manchester and dismissed the case.  Resolution of the other 
partners' appeal turns on the interplay between the "technical, 
precedent-bound" rule that, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, 
a limited partner is considered a citizen of each state in which 
its partners are citizens, and the flexible, pragmatic federal 
procedural rules of joinder. 
     We reverse.  Applying the joinder rules pragmatically, we 
hold that, because all of the partners of this small limited 
partnership are before the district court, joinder of the 
partnership entity is not required.  Specifically, we conclude 
that, given proper protective provisions in the judgment, 
proceeding in the absence of the Partnership will cause no 
prejudice to Manchester; that the Partnership is effectively 
represented by the partners and consequently suffers no prejudice 
from its exclusion; that whether or not the plaintiffs' claims 
are "derivative" is immaterial; and that Manchester's 
counterclaims can be heard in this federal court action and thus 
there is no risk of piecemeal litigation.  For these reasons, the 
requisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 are satisfied.  
We also hold that under Delaware law, the source of any cause of 
action plaintiffs have for breach of the Partnership Agreement, 
they are real parties in interest within the meaning of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17. 
 
                 I. Facts and Procedural History 
     HB Partners, L.P. (the Partnership) was formed in October 
1991, to develop three properties in Manchester, Vermont for 
commercial leasing.  At its inception, the Partnership consisted 
of one general partner, plaintiff HB General Corp., and two 
limited partners, plaintiff HB Limited Realty Corp. and defendant 
Manchester Partners, L.P..  HB General and HB Limited (the HB 
entities) are controlled by Ben Hauben, a major developer of 
retail stores in Vermont.  They are both Delaware corporations 
with their principal places of business in Vermont.  Manchester 
is organized under New Jersey law and all of its partners are New 
Jersey residents.  The Partnership was formed under Delaware law, 
and Delaware law governs construction of the Partnership 
Agreement. 
     Under that Agreement, Manchester was to provide the bulk of 
the Partnership's capital.  It contributed $990,000 at the 
Partnership's formation and was to provide additional capital up 
to a total of $1,980,000 in response to capital calls made by the 
general partner, HB General.  The Partnership Agreement provides 
that HB General may call for additional contributions of capital 
whenever the Partnership will hold less than $500,000 in cash or 
cash equivalents in the ensuing thirty days.  Each capital call 
can be for up to $500,000, of which ninety-nine percent is to be 
paid by Manchester and one percent by HB General. 
     HB General made a series of capital calls which were met by 
Manchester without incident.  However, problems arose in the 
summer of 1994.  On June 10, 1994, HB General made a capital call 
for $250,000, of which Manchester's share was $247,500.  
Manchester sent a check for this amount, but placed conditions on 
its use, demanding that the funds be held in escrow until all 
building permits and required approvals were obtained.  HB 
General found these conditions improper and returned the check to 
Manchester.  On August 11, 1994, HB General again made a capital 
call, this time for $400,000, $396,000 of which was due from 
Manchester.  Manchester notified HB General by letter dated 
September 13, 1994, that it would not make the capital 
contribution.  
     The Partnership Agreement provides that if Manchester fails 
to make a requested capital contribution, it will be considered 
to have withdrawn from the Partnership and shall have no further 
rights as a partner.  In such event, Manchester becomes a 
subordinated creditor of the Partnership and is entitled only to 
a return of its capital contributions at a specified time in the 
future.  The HB entities assert that Manchester's failure to meet 
the August 11 capital call has triggered this provision.  They 
brought this declaratory judgment action in the district court, 
seeking a declaration that Manchester has lost its status as a 
limited partner and is now a subordinated creditor.  Federal 
jurisdiction was asserted on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship. 
     According to Manchester, however, the parties' dispute is 
much more complicated than whether Manchester failed to meet a 
simple capital call.  Manchester asserts that at the time of the 
August 11 capital call, the Partnership was significantly behind 
schedule in developing the Vermont properties, and that HB 
General had failed to meet numerous requirements of the 
Partnership Agreement.  Manchester claims that because of these 
problems, it had informed HB General -- prior to the final 
capital call -- that it would exercise its "redemption option."  
This option, provided for in the Partnership Agreement, allows 
Manchester to have its Partnership interest "redeemed" at a price 
specified by formula in the event that the Partnership fails to 
commence construction on two of the three properties (the 
Manchester Square II Property and the Riverbend Property) by 
October 10, 1994.  The agreement states that if the Partnership 
does not pay the redemption price, Manchester's sole remedy is to 
compel a sale of any undeveloped parcels then owned by the 
Partnership. 
     Manchester maintains that by August 11, 1994, when HB 
General made the final capital call, HB General knew both that 
the Partnership could not commence construction on the Manchester 
Square II Property and the Riverbend Property by October 10, 
1994, and that Manchester intended to exercise its redemption 
option.  Manchester claims that HB General made the capital call 
in bad faith to force Manchester to choose between infusing a 
substantial sum of cash into the Partnership just prior to 
exercising its right of redemption -- money that might not be 
recoverable given the redemption option's limited remedy -- or 
defaulting on its obligation. 
     According to Manchester, it intended to file suit to force 
HB General to recognize Manchester's right to exercise its 
redemption option, but before it could do so, the HB entities 
filed this action.  Manchester therefore counterclaimed against 
HB General and HB Limited, and against third-party defendants, 
the Partnership itself and Vanderbilt Development Corporation 
(another entity controlled by Ben Hauben).  Manchester complains 
that because of the Partnership's failure to commence 
construction as scheduled and to recognize Manchester's right to 
exercise its redemption option, the plaintiffs breached the 
Partnership Agreement, their fiduciary duties to Manchester, and 
their covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Manchester seeks, 
inter alia, the following relief:  (a) specific performance of 
those provisions of the Partnership Agreement giving Manchester 
the right to exercise its redemption option and to compel the 
sale of the properties; (b) attachment, foreclosure and sale of 
the Partnership properties and the other properties for which 
Partnership funds have been expended; (c) imposition of a 
constructive trust on all the properties; and (d) damages. 
     After Manchester unsuccessfully moved to transfer the case 
to the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, 
Manchester filed a parallel action in Vermont state court, 
seeking essentially the same relief as it seeks in federal court.  
Manchester then moved to dismiss this federal action on the basis 
that the Partnership was an indispensable party whose joinder 
would destroy diversity.  The district court granted Manchester's 
motion.  Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a), the 
court held that the Partnership itself has significant interests 
in this litigation and should be joined if feasible.  The court 
then concluded under Rule 19(b) that the Partnership is 
indispensable, even if joinder is not feasible, in view of 
prejudice to Manchester and to the Partnership that would arise 
if the Partnership is excluded.  Because, for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes, a limited partnership is considered a 
citizen of each state in which its partners (both general and 
limited) are citizens, Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 
(1990), joinder of the Partnership would destroy diversity of 
citizenship.  Thus, the district court dismissed the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
     We review the district court's Rule 19(a) determination that 
joinder is required if feasible under a plenary standard to the 
extent that it rests on conclusions of law and under a clear 
error standard as to any subsidiary findings of fact.  Janney 
Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 404 
(3d Cir. 1993).  We review for abuse of discretion the court's 
Rule 19(b) determination that a person is indispensable and that 
dismissal is required because the person's joinder is not 
feasible.  Id. at 403. 
 
                          II. Rule 19(a) 
     Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 determines when joinder 
of a particular person is compulsory.  A court must first 
determine whether the person should be joined pursuant to Rule 
19(a).  If Rule 19(a) is satisfied but joinder is "not feasible" 
-- because, inter alia, joinder would destroy diversity 
jurisdiction -- the court must apply Rule 19(b) to determine 
whether, "in equity and good conscience," the party is 
"indispensable."  If the court determines that the party is 
indispensable, the action must be dismissed. 
     We agree with the district court that, pursuant to Rule 
19(a), this Partnership should be joined if feasible.  Under Rule 
19(a), a person should be joined if: 
     (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be 
     accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person 
     claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
     action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
     action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical 
     matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect 
     that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 
     parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring 
     double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations 
     by reason of the claimed interest. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).  Assuming that the Partnership has 
interests as an entity, a question to which we will turn 
presently, the Partnership clearly has an interest in this case:  
Manchester's obligation to provide capital -- the alleged breach 
of which is the basis of the HB entities' suit -- ran to the 
Partnership, see 4 Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg 
and Ribstein on Partnership § 15.04(g), at 15:34 (1994) (stating 
that the partnership itself has a claim for nonpayment of a 
limited partner's contribution to the partnership); and, if 
Manchester remains a partner it will force the sale of the 
Partnership's real property.  Given the Partnership's interests, 
joinder of the Partnership is required under Rule 19(a)(2) if 
feasible:  the Partnership might be able to bring identical 
claims against Manchester, or, alternatively, the Partnership's 
claims might be extinguished in this action by the HB entities.  
 
                         III. Rule 19(b)      
                         A.  Introduction 
     Although Rule 19(a) requires joinder if feasible, joinder is 
not feasible in this case because of the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990).  Carden held 
that, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, a limited partnership 
is considered a citizen of each state in which its partners are 
citizens.  Thus, although there is complete diversity without 
joinder of the Partnership because the suit is brought by two 
Delaware and Vermont citizens against a New Jersey citizen, 
diversity will be destroyed if the Partnership, a citizen of 
Vermont, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, is joined.  Because 
joinder is therefore not feasible, this case should be dismissed 
if the Partnership is deemed an indispensable party.  The 
question, then, is whether this case can, "in equity and good 
conscience," proceed without the Partnership as a party, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 19(b).  We conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in holding that the case cannot so proceed. 
     In contrast to Carden's jurisdictional rule, which the 
Supreme Court acknowledged to be "technical, precedent-bound, and 
unresponsive to policy considerations," Carden, 494 U.S. at 196, 
whether a person is indispensable depends on "pragmatic 
considerations," Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 Advisory Committee Notes to 
the 1966 Amendment; see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116 n.12 (1968).  Rule 19(b) lists 
several factors to consider in deciding whether a person is 
indispensable: 
     first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the 
     person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or 
     those already parties; second, the extent to which, by 
     protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping 
     of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be 
     lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered 
     in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, 
     whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if 
     the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).  Applying these factors, the district 
court dismissed the case, concluding that exclusion of the 
Partnership would prejudice the Partnership's interests and, 
because of the possibility that the Partnership itself could 
later sue on the same claims, would prejudice Manchester's 
interests; that protective provisions in the judgment could not 
lessen this prejudice; and that the plaintiffs have an adequate 
remedy if the suit is dismissed because of the identical 
litigation filed by Manchester in Vermont state court.  The court 
also decided that the HB entities' suit is a derivative action, 
and found guidance in cases holding that a partnership is an 
indispensable party in derivative actions.  Manchester echoes all 
of these reasons and offers, as an additional reason for 
dismissal, that its counterclaims against the Partnership cannot 
be heard in federal court.  We conclude that none of the reasons 
offered for dismissal is meritorious. 
 
                    B. Manchester's Interests 
     Taking the easiest question first, we conclude that 
protective provisions in the judgment can effectively avoid any 
prejudice to Manchester that might be caused by excluding the 
Partnership from the litigation.  We acknowledge that Manchester 
would be prejudiced if this litigation will not bind the 
Partnership itself, thus allowing the Partnership to later bring 
an identical claim.  But the Partnership, like a marionette, 
cannot make a move unless some human being pulls the strings.  
And all the people who, under the Partnership Agreement, have the 
power to cause the Partnership to bring suit -- probably only HB 
General, see Partnership Agreement § 5.2, App. 142 ("No Limited 
Partner in its capacity as Limited Partner shall take part in the 
conduct or control of the business of the Partnership or have any 
right or authority to act for or bind the Partnership."), but in 
no case people other than the present parties, HB General, HB 
Limited, and Manchester -- are before the court.  The court can 
therefore enjoin all the partners from bringing a subsequent suit 
on behalf of the Partnership. 
     Furthermore, the court can require HB General to cause the 
Partnership to release its claim against Manchester as a 
condition of judgment, thus ensuring that even if one of the 
current partners assigns its partnership interest to a new 
person, that person cannot initiate suit on behalf of the 
Partnership.  See Partnership Agreement § 6.1, App. 142 (Subject 
to certain limitations, "the General Partner is authorized, in 
furtherance of the business of the Partnership, to make 
decisions, take actions and enter into and perform contracts of 
any kind necessary, proper, convenient or advisable to effectuate 
the purposes of the Partnership.")  In short, protective 
provisions in the judgment can avoid all prejudice to Manchester, 
and thus prejudice to Manchester is not a reason to dismiss this 
case. 
 
                  C. The Partnership's Interests 
     The district court also decided, and Manchester argues, that 
exclusion of the Partnership would prejudice the Partnership's 
interests.  We disagree.  Although indispensability under Rule 19 
is a question of federal law, state law determines the nature of 
the interests of all the individuals concerned.  See Provident 
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 n.22 
(1968); Hertz v. Record Publishing Co., 219 F.2d 397, 399-400 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912 (1955).  The relevant state law 
here is that of Delaware, as the partnership is organized 
pursuant to Delaware law, Partnership Agreement Art. III, App. 
137-38, and Delaware law is the source of any cause of action the 
Partnership may have for Manchester's breach of contract, seePartnership 
Agreement § 17.5, App. 174 ("[T]his Agreement shall 
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
Delaware . . . .").   
     First we must decide whether, under Delaware law, the 
Partnership has interests as an entity in this case.  
Historically, the common law considered partnerships to be 
collections of individuals rather than distinct jural entities 
with their own interests.  See 1 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra § 
1.03, at 1:20; Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480 
(1933); Silliman v. DuPont, 302 A.2d 327, 331 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1972), aff'd, F.I. Du Pont, Glore, Forgan & Co. v. Silliman, 310 
A.2d 128 (Del. 1973).  However, today there is much ambivalence 
about the appropriate characterization of partnerships.  See 1 
Bromberg & Ribstein, supra § 1.03, at 1:19 to 1:20, 1:40.  
Delaware, like most states, has not adopted either a pure 
aggregate or pure entity theory of partnerships, but seems to 
treat partnerships differently for different purposes.  SeeSilliman, 302 
A.2d 332 n.4 (noting that the evolution of the 
Uniform Partnership Act has been viewed as a "realistic 
accommodation of entity theory to aggregate practice which leaves 
unresolved many problems concerning the legal nature of 
partnerships . . . .").  Limited partnerships, with their 
limitations on limited partner liability and control, are clearly 
more entity-like than general partnerships, but even these are 
not treated as entities in all contexts.  See 3 Bromberg & 
Ribstein, supra § 11.03(a), at 11:27; cf. Silliman, 302 A.2d at 
327 (recognizing the lack of a coherent view of the nature of 
partnerships in a case involving a limited partnership). 
     We conclude that, under Delaware law, the Partnership has 
interests as an entity in this case.  Delaware treats 
partnerships -- even general ones -- as entities for purposes of 
owning property, see generally 1 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra § 
1.03(c)(1), at 1:23 to 1:25.  For example, a partnership can 
acquire and convey real property in its own name, Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 6, § 1508(c); an individual partner has only limited rights 
to possession and assignment of partnership property, id. § 
1525(b); an individual partner's right in partnership property is 
not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against 
the partnership, id.; and an individual partner cannot devise 
partnership property, id..  Moreover, this Partnership has 
several property interests that are implicated by this 
litigation.  Most obviously, if Manchester wins this litigation, 
it will compel a sale of the Partnership's undeveloped real 
property.  In addition, a partnership's causes of action are 
themselves partnership property, see 2 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra§ 
5.03(d), at 5:21, and the Partnership may have a cause of 
action that will be effectively decided in this case.  Manchester 
has allegedly breached a duty to the Partnership, and thus it 
appears that the Partnership itself has a cause of action against 
Manchester.  See 4 id. § 15.04(g), at 15:34 (stating that the 
partnership itself has a claim for nonpayment of a limited 
partner's contribution to the partnership).  Thus, under Delaware 
law, the Partnership, as an entity, has interests in this case. 
     That said, we do not believe the Partnership's interests 
would, as a practical matter, be prejudiced by excluding it from 
the action.  Even though the Partnership has its own interests, 
it is an artificial entity:  its interests must ultimately derive 
from the interests of the human beings that are its members 
(albeit through the medium of other partnerships and 
corporations).  The exact relationship between the Partnership's 
interests as an entity and those of the individual partners has 
not been addressed by the Delaware courts.  But, following Rule 
19's pragmatic approach, we are guided by common sense.  A 
partnership's interests as an entity consist of an aggregation of 
those interests of each of the individual partners that are 
relevant to the purpose of the partnership.  Thus, at least in 
certain cases, it is possible that a partnership's interests can 
be effectively represented in litigation by participation of its 
partners. 
     We believe that to be the case here.  This partnership 
consists of at most three partners, all of whom are before the 
court.  Although each of the partners may arguably bring to bear 
some interests (the nature of which no one has identified) that 
are distinct from those of the Partnership, we have no doubt that 
the Partnership's interests in this case are adequately 
represented by the partners.  If the Partnership has a claim 
against Manchester and the right to retain its real property, 
these interests will be effectively advanced by the HB entities.  
And even if the HB entities' interests are not entirely 
consistent with those of the Partnership, they are not 
antagonistic.  Furthermore, to the extent the HB entities' 
interests diverge from the Partnerships's interests, Manchester 
can protect them. 
     This case is thus analogous to Delta Financial Corp. v. Paul 
D. Comanduras & Associates, 973 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1991).  There, 
the Fourth Circuit stated, in an action between the only two 
partners of a limited partnership: 
          Even if the partnership entity may under some 
     circumstances be a necessary or indispensable party to 
     litigation involving the constituent partners, which we 
     do not suggest, we are of opinion that Vanguard [the 
     partnership] is not necessary or indispensable to the 
     instant dispute.  This action arises out of a strictly 
     internal conflict between the partners, all of whom, 
     after our decision today, will be before the district 
     court.  PDS has failed to establish that Vanguard 
     itself has any interest distinct from the interests of 
     the several partners.  Thus, we are satisfied that 
     "complete relief [may] be accorded among those already 
     parties," and that Vanguard claims no interest 
     different from the interest of the partners that may be 
     impaired by the imposition of the case and that 
     Vanguard's absence will not "leave any of the persons 
     already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
     incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
     obligations." 
Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted); see also DM II, Ltd. v. 
Hospital Corp., 130 F.R.D. 469, 473 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (stating, 
in an action brought by some but not all partners, "Joinder of 
each non-party partner would ordinarily satisfy Rule 19, since 
the interests of the partnership would be adequately 
represented").  Although in some cases the interests of the 
partners may sufficiently diverge from those of the partnership 
that the partnership is an indispensable party, we simply cannot 
conceive of any interest the Partnership has as an entity in this 
case that will not be advanced by the three partners. 
 
                      D. Derivative Actions 
     The district court and Manchester also attach much 
significance to whether this action is a derivative action.  In 
their view, the HB entities' action is derivative and they 
believe this provides a special reason that the Partnership must 
be joined.  They cite to many cases finding the Partnership to be 
an indispensable party in derivative actions.  See, e.g., 
Bankston v. Burch, 27 F.3d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994); Buckley 
v. Control Data Corp., 923 F.2d 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 
                  1. Is this Action Derivative? 
     As a preliminary matter, we are not at all certain that this 
is a derivative action.  It is true that Delaware courts have 
stated the general rule that whether an action is derivative or 
direct depends on whether the harm alleged by the plaintiff is 
independent of harm suffered by the corporation or partnership 
itself.  See Kramer v. Western Pacific Industries, Inc., 546 A.2d 
348, 351-52 (Del. 1988); Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, 
Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 15 (Del. Ch. 1992); see also generally 12B 
Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations § 5911, at 483-84.  And 
here the harm alleged by the HB entities -- breach of 
Manchester's obligation to provide capital to the Partnership -- 
was suffered by the partners only through its harm to the 
Partnership. 
     But, in this case brought by those in control of the 
Partnership, the action may still not be derivative.  The 
derivative action device, with its attendant demand requirement, 
was developed to aid investors who have no control over a company 
redress harms to the company in the face of management's 
inaction.  See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970); 2 
Bromberg & Ribstein, supra s 5.05(a), at 5:35 ("The substantive 
distinction [between direct] enforcement of a partnership right 
by fewer than all the partners [and a derivative action] is not 
always clear but seems to be this:  In a derivative suit, the 
plaintiff partner is typically acting against the wishes of those 
partners who have decisionmaking authority for enforcement of the 
partnership right . . . ."); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 
17-0001 (stating, in the subchapter entitled "Derivative 
Actions," "A limited partner may bring an action in the Court of 
Chancery in the right of a limited partnership to recover a 
judgment in its favor if general partners with authority to do so 
have refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those 
general partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed.") 
(emphasis added). 
     Here, the action was brought in part by the general partner, 
who has authority to act for the Partnership.  In Delaware, 
general partners have the power to sue directly on behalf of the 
partnership on the partnership's claims.  See Thompson Door Co. 
v. Haven Fund, 351 A.2d 864, 865 (Del. 1976) ("Each [general] 
partner has the power to use ordinary legal process to enforce 
obligations owed the partnership and therefore may engage counsel 
to sue on behalf of the firm."); Partnership Agreement § 6.1, 
App. 142 (Subject to certain limitations, "the General Partner is 
authorized, in furtherance of the business of the Partnership, to 
make decisions, take actions and enter into and perform contracts 
of any kind necessary, proper, convenient or advisable to 
effectuate the purposes of the Partnership."); 4 Bromberg & 
Ribstein, supra § 15.02(b), at 15:13, & § 15.02(e), at 15:16 to 
15:17.  The power to sue "on behalf" of a partnership does not 
mean that the partnership itself must be named as a party:  
although Delaware has a "common name" statute, allowing 
partnerships to sue and be sued in the partnership name, see Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3904, its "use, although often convenient, 
is not mandatory."  Furek v. University of Delaware, 594 A.2d 
506, 513 (Del. 1991); see, e.g., Verlaque v. Charles A. Zonko 
Builder, Inc., 1989 WL 112029 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1989) 
(action brought by plaintiff "individually and on behalf" of a 
partnership).  Thus, the HB entities can sue directly to enforce 
Manchester's obligation to the Partnership, and do not need to 
resort to a derivative action. 
     Another reason this action may not be derivative is that the 
HB entities may have the right to bring suit directly as 
individuals.  The basis for any cause of action here is 
Manchester's alleged breach of the Partnership Agreement.  Both 
HB General and HB Limited are parties to the agreement, and 
breach of a Partnership Agreement has been held to constitute an 
individual as well as a partnership claim.  See 4 Bromberg & 
Ribstein, supra § 15.04(h), at 15:37 & n.35.  Thus the HB 
entities can bring this suit through a number of different means, 
and the action need not be characterized as derivative. 
 
    2. The Immateriality of the Characterization of this Suit 
                          (a) To Rule 19 
     For purposes of this appeal, we need not decide, however, 
whether, under state law, the HB entities are suing derivatively, 
directly on behalf of the Partnership, or directly as 
individuals.  As far as Rule 19 is concerned, state law is 
relevant only in determining the interests of those affected by 
the litigation.  See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 n.22 (1968); Hertz v. Record 
Publishing Co., 219 F.2d 397, 399-400 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
349 U.S. 912 (1955).  Once these interests are determined, 
federal law governs the balancing of interests in determining 
indispensability.  See Patterson, 390 U.S. at 125 n.22; Hertz, 
219 F.2d at 400.  Thus, even if the relevant state law requires 
joinder of a partnership in derivative actions and actions on 
behalf of the partnership in cases brought in the state's courts, 
that will not affect the balancing of interests under Rule 19.  
See Hertz, 219 F.2d at 399-400 ("Even if, in a suit in a 
Pennsylvania court, such officers are indispensable as a 
procedural requirement, they are not necessarily indispensable in 
a federal court.").  
     Moreover, the characterization of this action as derivative 
or on behalf of the Partnership has no impact on our earlier 
analysis of the interests of the Partnership and the partners.  
The only significant consequence of such a characterization for 
determining the relevant interests is that the Partnership itself 
has a cause of action.  But we considered the Partnership's 
potential cause of action and its implications in that earlier 
analysis. 
     We recognize that the Supreme Court has stated, in the 
corporations context, that the corporation is an indispensable 
party in stockholder derivative actions.  See Ross v. Bernhard, 
396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 
330 U.S. 518, 522 n.2 (1947); Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 626, 627 (1873); see also Guerrino v. Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Co., 423 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 1970).  If meant as a 
general rule, this statement is in tension with the Court's 
admonitions that "Whether a person is 'indispensable,' that is, 
whether a particular lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of 
that person, can only be determined in the context of particular 
litigation," and that "[t]here is no prescribed formula for 
determining in every case whether a person . . . is an 
indispensable party."  Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 & n.14 (1968) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  But even if it is the rule 
that the corporation is indispensable in a shareholder's 
derivative action, the partnership context in general, and this 
case in particular, are distinguishable. 
     Unlike partnerships, the corporation's status as a distinct 
jural entity is deeply rooted in our law; the bright lines that 
come with this status are one of the corporate form's major 
attractions.  Thus, a clear rule for joinder may be uniquely 
appropriate for the corporation context.  And, generally, shares 
in corporations are much more quickly and easily transferred than 
partnership interests, making a determination of whether the 
aggregation of stockholder's interests sufficiently represents 
the corporation extremely difficult.  Partnerships lack 
consistent entity-treatment, and, at least for small 
partnerships, the determination of whether the partners' 
interests align with those of the partnership is not difficult.  
In this case, the partnership consists of essentially two (though 
formally three) members, and we are easily able to determine that 
the individual partners effectively represent the Partnership. 
 
                          (b) To Rule 17 
     Of course, the state-law characterization of an action as 
derivative or on behalf of another might affect joinder via Rule 
17.  Rule 17(a) states that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest," and that an action 
shall be dismissed if the real party in interest is not 
substituted or joined.  The Supreme Court, in stating that the 
corporation is an indispensable party in a stockholder's 
derivative action, stated that the corporation is the real party 
in interest.  Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).  We 
conclude, however, that Rule 17 does not require the 
partnership's joinder even if the HB entities' claims are 
derivative or otherwise on behalf of the Partnership. 
     The real party in interest rule ensures that under the 
governing substantive law, the plaintiffs are entitled to enforce 
the claim at issue.  See Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef 
Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1980); Virginia 
Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935, and cert. denied sub 
nom. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Virginia Elec. & Power 
Co., 415 U.S. 935 (1974); 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1543, at 334 (2d ed. 1990).  There may 
be multiple real parties in interest for a given claim, and if 
the plaintiffs are real parties in interest, Rule 17(a) does not 
require the addition of other parties also fitting that 
description.  See Wright et al. supra, at 340; see also, e.g., 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) ("An executor, administrator, guardian, 
bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in 
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, 
or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own 
name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is 
brought . . . .").  Thus, insofar as the HB entities are 
authorized to bring suit under Delaware law -- even derivatively 
or otherwise on behalf of the Partnership -- they are also real 
parties in interest. 
     This conclusion is informed by the fact that the original 
purpose of the real party in interest rule was permissive -- to 
allow an assignee to sue in his or her own name.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
17 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment.  The "modern 
function of the rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect 
the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually 
entitled to recover, and to ensure generally that the judgment 
will have its proper effect as res judicata."  Id.  As noted 
above, any doubt as to the preclusive effect of this litigation 
on the Partnership can be resolved by protective provisions in 
the judgment. 
     In sum, this action may well not be derivative but, at all 
events, the characterization of the suit is immaterial to either 
Rule 19 or Rule 17. 
 
                  E. Manchester's Counterclaims 
     Manchester offers one reason for dismissal not relied on by 
the district court:  that the Partnership is an indispensable 
party to Manchester's counterclaims but that joinder would 
destroy subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims 
because Manchester and the Partnership share citizenship in New 
Jersey.  If Manchester cannot pursue its counterclaims without 
participation of the Partnership and the Partnership must be 
excluded from the litigation, Manchester would have a strong 
argument for dismissal.  The third factor of Rule 19(b) -- 
"whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be 
adequate" -- considers the extent to which exclusion of an 
interested person would leave significant matters unadjudicated.  
See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 
102, 111 (1968) ("We read the Rule's third criterion . . . to 
refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, 
whenever possible . . . .").  However, as we shall presently 
explain, the Partnership can be joined as to Manchester's 
counterclaims, without destroying subject matter jurisdiction. 
     Complete diversity is required only when federal court 
jurisdiction is exercised under the federal diversity 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  See State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).  Under the 
Constitution, diversity jurisdiction requires only minimal 
diversity among the parties, i.e., at least one defendant and one 
plaintiff need be citizens of different states.  Id.  Here the 
district court has statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction 
over Manchester's counterclaims under the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
     28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides that, in general, if the district 
court has jurisdiction over one claim, it can maintain 
jurisdiction over claims that lack an independent basis of 
jurisdiction if those claims "are so related to claims" within 
the court's jurisdiction "that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution."  The rule applies even to claims asserted by or 
against additional parties.  Id.  Although the statute places 
certain limits on a court's ability to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims by or against non-diverse additional 
parties when the basis for the original claim is diversity 
jurisdiction, those limits only apply when the additional claims 
are brought by plaintiffs.  See Development Finance Corp. v. 
Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 160-61 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Indeed, we have specifically held that in a diversity 
action, the district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a defendant's counterclaim against non-diverse parties 
joined as third-party defendants to the counterclaims.  See In re 
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Insurance 
Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1236-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Texas Eastern Corp. v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 115 S. 
Ct. 291 (1994). 
     Thus, the only remaining question is whether Manchester's 
counterclaims are "so closely related to [the HB entities' 
claims] that they form part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III of the United States Constitution."  Claims are part 
of the same case or controversy if they share significant factual 
elements.  See Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d 
Cir. 1991) ("Claims are part of the same constitutional case if 
they "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact . . . .") 
(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)); 
White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993) 
("The claims need only revolve around a central fact pattern."). 
     Manchester's counterclaims rely on essentially the same 
facts as does its defense to the HB Entities' claims.  
Manchester's primary defense is that HB General's final capital 
call was ineffective because the Partnership could not commence 
construction as scheduled and thus that Manchester appropriately 
exercised its redemption option before the capital call was due.  
Manchester's counterclaims are that the Partnership, along with 
the HB entities and Vanderbilt Development Corporation (a Vermont 
corporation with its principal place of business in Vermont), 
breached the Partnership Agreement and the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing due to its failure to recognize Manchester's 
right to redemption and its attempted conversion of Manchester's 
partnership interest into that of a subordinated creditor.  Both 
the defense and the counterclaims require proof that construction 
was not commenced as scheduled; that, under the Partnership 
Agreement, Manchester had the right to exercise the redemption 
option; and that Manchester did exercise the redemption option.  
Manchester's counterclaims are thus within the supplemental 
jurisdiction of the district court. 
     In sum, joinder of the Partnership on the counterclaims will 
not destroy subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims 
even though Manchester and the Partnership share citizenship in 
New Jersey. 
 
                          IV. Conclusion 
     For the reasons we have explained, the district court's 
decision to dismiss this action for failure to join the 
Partnership was an abuse of discretion.  Because all the partners 
of this small limited partnership are before the court, the 
exclusion of the Partnership entity causes no prejudice to 
defendant Manchester or to the Partnership.  The presence of all 
the partners ensures that the district court can fashion 
protective provisions in the judgment to protect Manchester from 
a subsequent suit and that the interests of the Partnership will 
be effectively represented.  Furthermore, plaintiffs HB entities 
can proceed without the Partnership whether or not the action is 
derivative under state law:  that characterization is only 
relevant to determine the relative interests involved, which, as 
we have shown, will not be prejudiced by exclusion of the 
Partnership.  Finally, Defendant Manchester can bring its 
counterclaims against the Partnership in this action under the 
district court's supplemental jurisdiction, and thus there is no 
risk of piecemeal litigation.  The judgment of the district court 
will be reversed, and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
